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PERSPECTIVE
Arabia Infelix: The War Devouring Yemen
SHEILA CARAPICO
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For many centuries, European cartographers labeled the southwest corner of the other-wise mostly desert Arabian Peninsula as Ara-
bia Felix, or “Happy Arabia.” It was a place where 
towering mountains trapped clouds blown in from 
the Indian Ocean so that twice-annual monsoon 
rains blessed terraced slopes and lowland wadis 
with plentiful crops. Sadly, since fighting engulfed 
the country in late March 2015, Yemen has never 
been less felix.
The brutal war and humanitarian catastrophe in 
Yemen are the consequences of domestic and espe-
cially regional power struggles. Often cast as a sec-
tarian battle between Sunni and Shia Muslims, it 
is more accurately understood on the one hand as 
a banal rivalry between two discredited presidents 
and on the other as an unprovoked counterrevo-
lutionary war by wealthy Gulf monarchies against 
a poverty-stricken republic where citizens rose up 
against decades of inept, corrupt rule. As fighting 
raged and coalitions on both sides unraveled, the 
sectarian narrative also grew tattered.
Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis took to the 
streets in sustained, colorful, peaceful nationwide 
demonstrations for months on end in 2011, chant-
ing the same slogan that toppled dictators in Tu-
nisia and Egypt: “The people want the downfall 
of the regime.” Armed tribesmen laid down their 
weapons to protest. Young people wrote manifes-
tos and staged street performances. Northerners 
and Southerners, Zaydis and Shafa’is, peasants 
and urbanites, women and men turned out in ver-
itable unison. The Nobel Peace Prize committee 
recognized a Yemeni woman, Tawakkol Karman, 
a gifted public speaker, as a symbolic leader of the 
Arab Spring.
The Gulf dynasties fretted over the North Afri-
can uprisings, but were especially alarmed by the 
raucous clamor for revolutionary change on their 
proverbial doorstep. Eventually the carbon king-
doms persuaded a reluctant President Ali Abdul-
lah Saleh to relinquish power to his long-serving 
vice president, Abdurabbu Mansur Hadi. Instead 
of regime change, the protesters achieved only a 
regime makeover.
Hadi, the only candidate, “won” a two-year 
term in an election in February 2012 hastily ar-
ranged under the auspices of the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (GCC), an association of the six oil 
monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula comprising 
Saudi Arabia and the smaller states of Kuwait, the 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. 
The so-called GCC Initiative also granted Saleh 
and his family immunity from prosecution and left 
him as the leader of the party with a parliamen-
tary majority. Concurrently, it funded a National 
Dialogue Conference of over 650 Yemeni delegates 
from various constituencies that was intended to 
facilitate a post-Saleh, post-Hadi transition. The 
conference, meeting with international consul-
tants in five-star hotels, dragged on inconclusively.
Eventually, the feuding presidents proved will-
ing to destroy the country in order to restore dic-
tatorship. Their respective alliances complicated 
and sectarianized the nasty rivalry between the 
two self-serving, nonideological secularists.
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
In a counterintuitive turn of events, in Septem-
ber 2014 Saleh joined forces with a group called 
Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), also known as 
the Houthis—a ragtag militia from the far north, 
near the Saudi border, that had waged six sepa-
rate regional rebellions against his regime. The 
Houthis are a self-styled Zaydi revivalist move-
ment within the Shia school of Islam, opposed to 
Wahhabism, the ultraconservative Saudi brand of 
Sunni Islam. They marched on Sana’a, the capital, 
to protest policies announced by Hadi—especially 
a fuel price increase recommended by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and a scheme (devised by 
foreign consultants and announced after minimal 
domestic debate) to reorganize provinces into six 
“federal” regions that left the Houthi’s homeland 
landlocked.
The national armed forces, in which Saleh 
loyalists retained essential commands, offered 
no resistance as the Houthis entered the capi-
tal. Hadi was placed under house arrest. Saleh’s 
party, the General People’s Congress, expelled 
him. In early 2015, he fled to his hometown of 
Aden, the onetime capital of the old People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (or South Ye-
men), which existed until 1990. In Aden and the 
south, an overwhelming majority had yearned 
for renewed separation from “unified” Yemen 
since the 1994 civil war. In late March, Hadi 
went into exile in Riyadh and appealed to the 
kingdom to reinstate him in the presidential pal-
ace in Sana’a. Frequently referred to as the “in-
ternationally recognized president,” but lacking 
a domestic constituency or mandate, he nomi-
nally “governs” from exile.
On March 26, 2015, the new Saudi king, 
Salman, and his son Muhammad bin Salman, the 
defense minister, launched what they called Op-
eration Decisive Storm on Hadi’s behalf. The de-
clared motivation for the Saudi-led intervention 
was and is to thwart Iranian influence in the pen-
insula. Because Zaydism is 
a sub-denomination of Shia 
Islam, the Saudis see Ansar 
Allah as an Iranian proxy. 
Despite the absence of any 
photographic or physical 
evidence, Riyadh continually 
insists that Iran is smuggling 
weapons to the Houthis—and US officials occa-
sionally repeat the claim.
Thus the convoluted power struggle in Yemen is 
frequently characterized as a battle of Sunni against 
Shia. This simplified sectarian frame, widely reit-
erated in the international media, implicitly places 
the Saudi-led coalition alongside al-Qaeda in the 
fight against the Zaydi-Shia Ansar Allah. But in a 
separate conflict ongoing in Yemen, the Americans 
continue to fire drone missiles and occasionally 
other weapons at suspected al-Qaeda positions, 
while concurrently siding with the Saudis against 
the Houthis. The local branch, known as al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula, has benefited strategi-
cally from the general mayhem, particularly in the 
southern regions where it has established a pres-
ence and seems to be fighting alongside Emirati 
forces against the Houthi and Saleh militias.
WANTON DEVASTATION
The viciousness on all sides is extreme. The 
Saleh-Houthi alliance has committed atrocities 
on the ground, particularly in attempting to oc-
cupy, control, and subdue Aden and the third 
major city, Ta’iz, which they subjected to a bitter 
siege after encountering fierce local resistance. 
They also recruit and exploit child soldiers. 
When they manage to shoot a few missiles across 
the northern border into Saudi Arabia, they do so 
indiscriminately.
However, the most devastating humanitarian 
and economic repercussions are inflicted from 
above and beyond by the superior firepower of 
fighter-jets, helicopter gunships, and naval war-
ships—all manufactured in the West and de-
ployed by the Saudi-led coalition. The United 
States, the United Kingdom, and several other 
NATO powers explicitly or implicitly share re-
sponsibility for the onslaught. The Obama and 
Trump administrations arranged the sale of over 
$300 billion worth of Hellfire missiles, cluster 
munitions, and other advanced weaponry to Sau-
di Arabia alone, and have participated directly 
in operations with in-air refueling, surveillance, 
and training. American, British, and other arms 
industries profit from the 
wanton and largely pointless 
belligerence. Boeing, Lock-
heed Martin, Raytheon, and 
Honeywell Aerospace are the 
major US suppliers and con-
tractors to the Saudis and the 
UAE.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and a few coalition part-
ners such as Egypt have enforced a draconian air 
and naval embargo, ostensibly to block the impor-
tation of Iranian weapons but in fact, according 
to international humanitarian organizations, also 
obstructing shipments of food, fuel, medical sup-
plies, and even the arrival of foreign journalists. 
The Sana’a airport’s runways were bombarded. 
The main Red Sea port at al-Hudaydah was delib-
erately put out of commission; inspectors refused 
to allow replacement equipment to be imported. 
Air strikes in most parts of the country disabled 
water and power supplies, damaged or closed 
hospitals and clinics, left craters in roads, top-
pled bridges, and blasted markets, factories, gas 
stations, hotels, and cultural sites. Hadi and his 
foreign backers shut down the banking system, 
so that civil servants—including first responders, 
health-care providers, and sanitation workers—
went without salaries indefinitely.
Two and a half years into the Saudi-led interven-
tion, some 21 million people—three-quarters of 
Yemen’s population—face food insecurity or severe 
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malnutrition. Untreated sewage has contaminated 
drinking water, causing what the United Nations 
calls the world’s largest cholera epidemic—nearly 
900,000 cases as of November 2017. Cholera is 
treatable, but the crippled health care system was 
already overwhelmed by patients suffering from 
war wounds and starvation. Many of the afflicted 
can’t reach hospitals because of damage to roads 
and bridges.
Meanwhile, as many as three million people have 
abandoned their homes. Prevented from traveling 
abroad by the air and naval blockades and strict 
border controls, and without systematic interna-
tional assistance, they have sheltered with extend-
ed family, in makeshift tents, or in caves. It is worth 
underscoring that the victims of internal displace-
ment, hunger, disease, and bombing are dispropor-
tionately the already underprivileged Afro-Yemenis 
of the Red Sea coastal region, who are Sunnis of the 
Shafa’i denomination, not Zaydi Shia. They are not 
supporters of either Saleh or the Houthis.
The internationally reported death toll from 
fighting alone reached about 10,000 by October 
2016. After that, the Ministry of Health and other 
national and international agencies lost count, 
while the pace of airstrikes accelerated—from just 
under 4,000 in all of 2016 to 5,676 in the first half 
of 2017, according to tallies from the Office of the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
SPLINTERING ALLIANCES
By the second half of 2017, events belied the 
simplistic story of a conflict driven by Sunni-Shia 
rivalries. Even the more convincing paradigm of 
geo-strategic rivalry between Iran and the dynastic 
autocracies of the Arab side of the Persian Gulf 
failed to pass the most rudimentary reality test 
when the Saudis and other GCC allies broke with 
Qatar. The UAE, a major party to the foreign inter-
vention (unlike Saudi Arabia it put boots on the 
ground), has begun pursuing its own independent 
policy in South Yemen. The alliance of GCC ruling 
families no longer shares a common purpose; they 
are are divided among themselves.
The temporary marriage of convenience be-
tween Saleh’s supporters and the Houthis is also 
on the rocks. In September 2017, the two groups 
staged large, rival rallies in Sana’a (the capital has 
been under their joint control for three years). Un-
like the joyful marches of 2011, when women and 
children were front and center, these were menac-
ing, heavily armed, all-male power displays. As in-
ternecine rifts in both camps threaten to widen and 
deepen the violence, the overwhelming majority 
of victims will continue to be innocent civilians. 
The poorest country in the Middle East is paying a 
heavy price for reckless, convoluted struggles for 
supremacy among domestic, regional, and inter-
national powers. !
